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abstract: we attempt to discern what Badiou’s philosophical system provides for thinking of 
education in a form which separates it from its contemporary representation in the state. these 
notes oppose to this state form Badiou’s declaration that ‘the only education is an education by 
truths’. we pursue this in three sections. First, we will address the significance and function of the 
term ‘conditions’. secondly we will address Badiou’s essay ‘art and Philosophy’ from Handbook of  
inaesthetics, the only essay in fact where Badiou addresses education in a specific manner and in 
which Badiou discusses the link between art and philosophy in terms of the ‘pedagogical theme’: 
a theme, he says, that has been brought to collapse. thirdly we will attempt to discern what 
might make up what Badiou refers to as the ‘fourth modality’ of the link between philosophy and 
its conditions through a somewhat speculative discussion of the dual ‘militant’ praxis known in 
Badiou’s work as ‘subtraction’ and ‘forcing’.
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‘Could anything show a more shameful lack of [education] than to 
have so little justice in oneself that one must get it from others, who 
thus become masters and judges over us?’ 
 
‘the sole remit for thought is to the school of decision’. 
 
‘…whence arises the obstacle to every valid account of the ef-
fects of education, since what brought about the results cannot be 
admitted to in discussing the intention’.3
. Plato, The Republic of  Plato, trans. F.M. Cornford, london, oxford University Press, 94, p. 95, 405a. or, 
in desmond lee’s translation, ‘it is the sign of a bad education if one seeks justice at the hands of others’, 
london, Penguin Books, 974, p. 68. see also Apology, 4b-7b esp. in Plato, The last Days of  Socrates, trans. 
& intro. Hugh tredennick, london, Penguin, 954, pp. 56-59. 
. alain Badiou, being and event, trans. oliver Feltham, london, Continuum, 006, p. 49 (henceforth 
Be). 
3. Jacques lacan, ‘Kant with sade’, in ecrits, trans. Bruce Fink with Heloise Fink and Russell Grigg, new 
York, w.w. norton & Company, 006, pp. 665/787. First published in english in October, trans. James B. 
swenson Jr., vol. 5, 989, pp. 55-75.
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alain Badiou says that what he admires most about Pascal is his effort to ‘invent the 
modern forms of an ancient conviction, rather than follow the way of the world’ (Be 
).4 that education is good is an ancient conviction. that the good it is needs to be 
given ‘modern form’, which is to say, something other than a state form is the underly-
ing wager of this paper. we take our direction from Badiou’s axiomatic and singular 
declaration that ‘the only education is an education by truths’.5 truths make ‘holes in 
knowledge’—that encyclopaedia of the state. this encyclopaedia provides the predica-
tive order of judgements such that a multiple ‘finds itself belonging to a set of multiples, 
that is, to a part’ (Be 38). in other words, to paraphrase from lacan it is the state which 
‘know[s] what you will do’.6 For Badiou, a truth, constituted as a generic procedure and 
subject to its event, necessarily entails a type of indifferent and ‘logical revolt’ against 
the state of the situation. Badiou’s claim in regard to an ‘education by truths’ suggests 
therefore something like an operation of immanent rivalry, ‘within justice’, to an educa-
tion by the state.7 of course, today, at the level of the (state) system, the knotting of the 
state and education is tighter than ever. this knot binds a complex historicity of ideol-
ogy, economy, desire and demand. this historicity is itself well worth tracing in light of 
Badiou’s ‘ethic of truths’ insofar as the state today incorporates and reconfigures many 
of the radical, emancipatory and authentic demands associated with education since the 
French Revolution. However, we will not be investigating the particulars of this situa-
tion here. Rather, we will attempt to discern what Badiou’s system provides for thinking 
of education in a form which separates the ancient conviction as to its virtue from its 
contemporary representation in the state. these notes will, nevertheless, set Badiou’s 
‘education by truths’ against the education of the state in the hope of discerning the pos-
sibilities for a ‘modern form that does not follow the way of the world’.
we will work through three linked variations on the pedagogical theme. First we will 
address the significance and function of the term ‘conditions’. secondly we will address 
Badiou’s essay ‘art and Philosophy’ from Handbook of  inaesthetics, the only essay in fact 
where Badiou addresses education in a specific manner,8 and in which Badiou discusses 
4. it is obvious that this says as much about Badiou as Pascal.
5. alain Badiou, ‘art and Philosophy’, in Handbook of  inaesthetics, trans. alberto toscano, stanford, stanford 
University Press, 005, p.3 (henceforth Hi).
6. and, ‘to know what your partner will do is not proof of love’. Jacques lacan. Seminar XX: On Feminine 
Sexuality, The limits of  love and Knowledge, 1972-1973, ed. Jacques-alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink new York, 
w.w. norton, 999, p.46, (p.33 in the French). if the state does not love, how then does it educate? one 
should recall that in articulating the argument that ‘deductive fidelity’ is the ‘equivocal paradigm of all fidel-
ity’, Badiou claims that one such example of this is the ‘proofs of love’. see Be, p. 54.
7. alain Badiou, ‘Philosophy and Politics’, in infinite Thought: Truth and the Return to Philosophy, ed. and trans. 
oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens, london, Continuum Press, 003, pp. 69-78. also translated under the 
same name by thelma sowley, Radical Philosophy 96, July/august 999, p. 30 and as ‘truths and Justice’, in 
Metapolitics, trans. Jason Barker, london, Verso, 006, pp. 96-06 (henceforth M). 
8. in the collection Conditions, Badiou does devote a short article to the question ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une institution 
philosophique?’ see Conditions, Paris, seuil, 99, pp. 83-90. see translation this issue. He discusses it in passing 
in an interview with Bruno Bosteels published in Gabriel Riera (ed.), Alain badiou: Philosophy and its Conditions, 
new York, suny, 005. and there are vague references in logiques des mondes, Paris, seuil, 006, i.e. see the 
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the link between art and philosophy in terms of the ‘pedagogical theme’: a theme, he 
says, that has been brought to collapse. thirdly we will attempt to discern what might 
make up what Badiou refers to as the ‘fourth modality’ of the link between philoso-
phy and its conditions through a somewhat speculative discussion of the dual ‘militant’ 
praxis known in Badiou’s work as ‘subtraction’ and ‘forcing’.
axioMatiC Conditions
one of the more well known features of Badiou’s philosophical system is that phi-
losophy does not produce truths itself but ‘has begun’ as a discourse under ‘conditions’.9 
the four conditions are Badiou says, ‘uniform… recognisable from afar, whose rela-
tion to thought is relatively invariant. the name of this invariance is clear: it is the 
name truth’.0 it is through a tripartite relation with the ‘wholly empty’ yet invariant 
category of truth that these four truth—or generic—procedures condition philosophy. 
Philosophy as such, will come to be as the thinking of their compossibility through the 
categories of being, event and subject. although this certainly causes some debate we 
are not concerned in this paper with why he opts for these four procedures alone. our 
concern ultimately is only for the ‘modality’ of the relation this term implies between 
the four procedures, truth and philosophy. this is because Badiou institutes the notion 
of the configuration of the four conditions—as a set of generic procedures—precisely 
as the condition of the freedom of philosophy. and so the form of the modality of the 
link, what he names in Handbook of  inaesthetics as the ‘pedagogical form’, as that which, 
suitably reconfigured, prevents philosophy’s suture to, and saturation by, one of these 
procedures, and yet maintains each as a condition, must be a pedagogy of freedom in 
some sense. 
From the ontology of love to the partitioning proofs of Ramsey cardinals, Mao’s 
expression ‘one divides into two’ has an axiomatic status in Badiou’s work. Metapolitically 
speaking, an axiom is that which is thrown up within the antagonism and contingency 
of a situational sequence. it is that immanent principle which a collective act not so 
much marches behind as pushes forward—libertié, egalité, fraternité —as itself.3 But, as 
table on p. 87.
9. alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. norman Madarasz, new York, suny Press, 999, p.33. Here-
after, MP.
0. Badiou, MP, p. 33.
. For arguments concerning this issue see slavoj Žižek. The Ticklish Subject: the absent centre of  political ontology, 
U.K, Verso, 000, esp. Ch 3, ‘the politics of truth, or, alain Badiou as a reader of st Paul’. pp.7-70. Here, 
Žižek argues for religion as a condition. as does simon Critchley in ‘demanding approval: on the ethics of 
alain Badiou’, Radical Philosophy 00, March/april 000, pp.6-7. Ray Brassier argues Capital itself might 
‘think’ and therefore qualify as a condition in, ‘nihil Unbound: Remarks on the subtractive ontology 
and thinking Capitalism’, in Think Again ed. Peter Hallward london, Continuum, 004, pp. 50-58. Justin 
Clemens sees in the ‘letter’ a ‘condition of conditions’ in ‘letters as the Condition of Conditions for alain 
Badiou’, Communication & Cognition, Vol. 36, nr. -, 003, pp.73-0. 
. Badiou, MP, p. 35.
3. on what has become of these today under conditions of a contemporary thermidor see, alain Badiou, 
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Badiou argues, this equality (the political form of justice) is not objective or part of 
the putative ends of a state program, but subjective; an expression in actu of the equal 
capacity for thought. He says, it is ‘not what we want or plan but what we declare under 
fire of the event, here and now as what is and not what should be’.4 an axiom functions 
as a declaration in language of the immanent singularity of what happens in a situation. 
it authorizes an operational decision drawn from its conditioning event, which it is 
the labour of thought to render consistent. oliver Feltham, deploying the term Badiou 
himself ‘steals’ from deleuze, names this operation the ‘disjunctive synthesis’ saying the 
‘synthesis’ is what ‘allows such an interruption to endure’.5 this division, at any stage, is 
not in the form of a subjective, objective split. it is instead a wholly operative, subjective 
and situational division, ‘singular and immanent’, and as such, this is what authorizes 
Badiou’s deployment of deleuze’s terminology.6 However, we must insist here that this 
borrowing of a name is not the same as borrowing that which it names. although it 
marks for both a conceptual form for thinking the (non)relation between being and 
thought, for Badiou it is through the event as (rare) irruption or, surrection, and not as 
‘univocal issue’ that this ‘relation’ is form[ed]: events mark ‘absolute beginnings’… ‘and 
singularities of thought incomparable in their constitutive gestures’; whereas for deleuze, 
according to Badiou at least, this ‘non-relation is still thought in relation to the one, 
which founds it by radically separating the terms involved’.7 For Badiou ‘disjunctive 
synthesis’ entails a non-conceptual, operational deployment and as such a procedure of 
inseparation as enduring fidelity to this immanent division.
this does not mean that philosophy (nor the philosopher) provides resolution or 
totalization of this division, between the event and its consequences, in the concept or 
anywhere else for that matter. Philosophy draws the consequences of this constitutive 
division in thought, faithfully maintaining the real of the disjunction within the resultant 
synthesis or consistency, demanded by the subjective creation of the concept—or, 
the thinking of its thought. this fidelity to Mao’s axiom has consequences all the way 
through Badiou’s work.8 Philosophy itself, on his terms, is the consequence or rather, 
the consequences drawn, of the decisive splitting of philosophy and ontology. the latter 
declared by Badiou to be mathematics. and mathematics provides the model of an 
le Siècle, Paris, seuil, 005, pp. 45-6. see also, Badiou, ‘what is a thermidorean’, in M, pp. 4-40.
4. Badiou, ‘Philosophy and Politics’, p. 7.
5. oliver Feltham, ‘and Being and event and…: Philosophy and its nominations’, Polygraph, no. 7, 005, 
p. 37.
6. alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamour of  being, trans. louise Burchill, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 999, p. 79.
7. Badiou, Deleuze, pp. 90-9 and p.  respectively.
8. it is worth noting that in his essay on justice and politics Badiou cites Mao’s dictum from the sixteen 
point decision: ‘let the masses educate themselves in this great revolutionary movement, let them deter-
mine by themselves the distinction between what is just and what is not’. ‘Philosophy and Politics’, p. 9. 
(Radical Philosophy version for this translation). see for the full text Mao tse-tung, ‘the sixteen point deci-
sion’, Point 4. appendix to Jean daubier, History of  the Chinese Cultural Revolution, trans. Richard sever, new 
York, Vintage Books, 974, p. 300.
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‘infinite thought’ or, a thought capable of thinking infinities.9 
when Badiou claims that philosophy is subject to conditions we are to hear this term 
functioning in two ways: it is the generic name for the four procedures as procedures, that 
is, ‘conditions’ is the nominal form given to mark these procedures in their ‘compossible’ 
singularity. at the same time these autonomously operating procedures ‘condition’—as 
in form or shape—that which is or will be the discourse of philosophy. they are the 
disciplinary operations by which these four procedures act upon the discourse that will 
be philosophy. and it is thus only within this constituted discourse that the ‘truths’ pro-
duced by the four conditions are one-ified or become compossible, or can be thought 
together: the ontological disjunction ‘synthesized’ through the thinking of their truths in 
a retroactive syntax which affirms the ‘being there’ (or there are) of truths. in this sense the 
conditions prescribe, and absolutely so, the possibilities of a philosophy’s form.0
in this way the ‘wholly empty’ category of truth acquires the tools necessary for it 
to become operational. Both ‘condition’ and ‘conditions’, as two instances of the singular 
(non)relation between a procedure and the philosophy it convokes, name, but again in 
two ways, this split between the finite conditions, the works of the procedures, and the 
infinite condition, the (immanent) idea, or the thought of these works that philosophy 
comes to think together. Philosophy is what will have been conditioned by its conditions. 
Badiou renders the structure of this effect, which is evidently pedagogical—though not 
as we might ordinarily understand it—as ‘what a thought declares to be a thought, on 
condition of which it thinks that which is a thought’. 
the singular importance for philosophy of these conditions—the work of the pro-
cedures—is that in their various operations they are capable of creating a sequence (of 
works), a consistent multiple, subject to an event (of its situation), such that it will be 
possible to say, something new, some truth, has come to be. it is important to remember 
however, that that which Badiou calls a truth is not incarnate, substantial or adequate 
by correspondence. in the final section we will elaborate on this further but it is impor-
tant in light of what a condition is for Badiou to remark that in relation to these ‘truths’ 
philosophy proceeds ‘in its history’ under these conditions, as the ‘desubstantialization 
of truth, which is also the self-liberation of its act’.3 thus it is incorrect to say, for ex-
9. Bruno Besana argues that it is in regard to ‘a model’ that Badiou’s thought of the being and the event 
can be most strictly demarcated from deleuze’s thought of being as an event. the argument involves ‘two 
readings of Plato’ and is beyond this essay. see Bruno Besana, ‘one or several events? the Knot Between 
event and subject in the work of alain Badiou and Gilles deleuze’, trans. Justin Clemens, in Polygraph, no. 
7, pp.45-66. see also Ray Brassier, ‘Badiou’s Materialist epistemology of Mathematics’, Angelaki, vol. 0, 
no. , august, 005. 
0. on the importance of this point see Justin Clemens, ‘Had we But worlds enough, and time, this ab-
solute, Philosopher…’ in this issue.
. alain Badiou, ‘definition of Philosophy’, in MP, p. 4.
. alain Badiou, ‘the Political as a Procedure of truth’, trans. Barbara P. Faulks, lacanian ink 19, Fall 00, 
p.8 and in M, as ‘Politics as a truth Procedure’, pp. 4-5.
3. Badiou, ‘définition de la philosophie’ in Conditions, p.8. i cite the original because i have modified the 
english translation from ‘definition of Philosophy’, p.44. 
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ample, a revolution is true or a poem is an event or to conflate the two. these may 
mark or inscribe a finite point in a process of truth but the process itself can never be 
totalized. a process does not belong to being as being but is precisely a subtraction from 
being that forces the logic of its appearing. its trajectory cannot be circumscribed by any 
predicative or finite expression because it is founded in the void, and as such is without 
representation and therefore without knowledge in the state. if this trajectory could be 
discerned or, in other words, predicated by a curricular process, it would merely belong 
to the existing regime of knowledge. its process would belong to the order of what was 
readily verifiable. 
thus these four procedures, art, mathematics, politics and love, are conditions for 
philosophy precisely because of their ‘extraordinary’ ability to formalize by the process-
es unique to their functioning the ‘truth(s)’ of the situation in which they operate; truths 
that are singular to their field, irreducible to any other and immanent to the situation 
in which these procedures appear. that is, the truths produced are singular to the work 
and thought of the procedure itself. there is no external surveillance in this regard and 
at the same time, nor does any single procedure organize the whole of truth within itself. 
no procedure can say that it alone constitutes all that truth is on pain of ‘disaster’.4 
thus, these procedures provide the ‘conditions’ for philosophy by their singular and 
immanent production of truths. in the dictionary definition wholly appropriate here, 
these conditions are ‘an indispensable requirement’. at the same time, in the modality of 
their operation, these procedures are a qualification, a limit and a restriction. they are 
a discipline. Here, ‘condition’ takes on its more directly pedagogical sense of forming, 
shaping (éduque), even prescribing. what they prescribe is precisely the form and shape 
of the trajectory of the enquiries made in the production of the generic, and by which 
the thought produced within this procedure is seized under the name of philosophy. we 
can get a sense of how this works if we think of it in the manner in which a coach is said 
to ‘condition’ an athlete. in effect without the condition-ing the ‘athlete’ would not, as 
the athletic subject, ‘have begun’. 
it is worth looking at an example here of how a condition ‘works’. to do this i will 
move quickly across Badiou’s description of the importance of the mathematical condi-
tioning of philosophy initiated by the Platonic decision to enquire into the consequences 
of the ‘mathematical rupture’. as one move in what amounts to a series of moves against 
the Heideggerian influence on contemporary thought, Badiou claims that philosophy 
begins with Plato. this beginning is due to the Platonic attention to mathematics as a 
form of thought which, as atemporal and ideal constitutes a break with doxa.5 this 
break is both once and for all, in the sense that mathematics is a break with doxa, and 
discontinuous in the sense that it will continue to be that thought which will have to 
4. alain Badiou, ethics: An essay on the understanding of  evil, trans. Peter Hallward, london, Verso, 000, p. 
7. 
5. Badiou, ‘Philosophy and Mathematics’, in Theoretical Writings, ed. and trans. Ray Brassier and alberto 
toscano, london, Continuum Books, 004, p. 4.
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break with doxa again and again.6 Certainly, time and again in Plato’s work socrates 
establishes as his starting point that there in fact is such a break with doxa. that is, 
that doxa, established circulating knowledge, already includes within its delimitations of 
knowledge a site ‘at the edge of the void’ which it represents as nothing. For Plato/soc-
rates it is this nothing, this knowledge of  nothing which can be thought under the condi-
tion of mathematics. such a thought will be a break with knowledge. as such, void to 
knowledge, it founds a thought whose intelligibility owes nothing to the regime of already 
existing knowledge. this intelligibility exists as that which will have been established. 
effectively, it is established that mathematics is a form of thought, one that thinks that 
which is intelligible against the perceptually immediate.7 this break, with what is for 
Badiou effectively opinion—mathematically speaking there are no opinions—demands 
a further break or intervention. this is because this first break is obscure insofar as its 
consequences for thought are concerned. what does it mean that mathematics proceeds 
as it does? in one sense this is perfectly amenable to doxa, knowledge or the state, in-
sofar as mathematics proceeds to follow a trajectory whose discoveries remain within 
mathematics. such discoveries remain, so Badiou says, ‘obscure and forced’ in the sense 
that mathematics is not free to break with opinion, or not, but working from hypothesis 
and making use of ‘axioms it cannot legitimate’ it is thus forced ‘under constraint of its 
own deductive chains […] themselves dependent upon a fixed point’, axiomatically or 
prescriptively stipulated, to rupture with opinion. thus it is this dual constraint of be-
ing forced and obscure that at once makes mathematics an essential thought due to its 
singular ability to affect the entirely necessary break with opinion, to instate discontinu-
ity into thought, and makes necessary a second break. and this precisely because the 
significance of this break must itself be thought. what consequences does the existence 
of a form of thought which breaks with doxa, with the knowledge that repeats as the 
way of knowing, that establishes discontinuity within thought, have for the freedom of 
thought? Philosophy must begin here. it is the discourse of the second break. as such 
the dialectic (in Plato) is the procedure by which this deductively present discontinuity 
is placed within thought. its obscurity is (or must be) rendered consistent outside itself. 
But this is not to be understood in the form of a subsumption; rather, in Badiou’s words 
‘mathematics amounts to an in between (metaxu) of thinking as such: that it intimates a 
gap which lies even beyond the break with opinion’.8 what Badiou is moving toward 
here is the claim that mathematics is ontology. what he wants to establish and precisely 
what links the notion of conditions and the notion of the ‘pedagogical theme’ is that 
mathematics is that which presents nothing. this nothing is the gap between knowledge 
as opinion or doxa and being. Being, being precisely what knowledge, in its sophistic 
state sense, claims to be knowledge of. what Badiou insists on and what he finds so es-
sential in the thought of Plato for example, is that Plato himself, in a sense forced by his 
6. Badiou, ‘Philosophy and Mathematics’, p. 9.
7. Badiou, ‘Platonism and Mathematical ontology’, Theoretical Writings, p. 50. whether mathematics 
‘thinks’ is a thorny issue (for some) still.
8. Badiou, ‘Philosophy and Mathematics’, p. 3.
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fidelity to mathematics, elaborates a discourse named philosophy which ‘establishe[s] 
the illumination of the continuous at the moment of discontinuity’. and he does so pre-
cisely at that point where mathematics has to offer only its ‘blind, stubborn inability to 
propose anything other than the intelligible and the break’.9 Philosophy as a particular 
conditioned operation comes to elaborate within a space of freedom this truth which is 
the demonstrated break with opinion. Philosophy thinks the consequences of a thought 
that is other than opinion (or in Badiou’s terms, knowledge) on condition of the condi-
tioned break with that knowledge. we have no room here to do so but as is well known 
each of Badiou’s four conditions can be similarly explicated as to their particular and 
irreducible role in conditioning philosophy; which is to say, of establishing the effect of 
an encounter as a transformation.
so ‘condition’, or to condition, one could almost say belongs to the register of the 
future anterior in that to argue that the conditions as we have described them also condi-
tion philosophy is, in a way, to subject philosophy to an exam as to its performance 
regarding what it does with these truths produced by the four procedures.30 this might 
suggest, to take up the terminology of a thesis developed by Bruno Bosteels, that we are 
dealing with a dialectical materialism, of a sort (perhaps, indeed, a ‘materialist dialec-
tic), in which neither the finite (subject) nor the infinite (of the procedure it supports) 
provide the substance of which the other is ‘merely’ the idea.3 such a suggestion, on 
the one hand, would then invert what Badiou calls the didactic schema, whereby it is 
philosophy that authorizes the truths of art and, on the other, it would authorize a step 
beyond what he calls the romantic schema whereby philosophy drags along in the wake 
of art (or logic) as a fawning servant come journalist in thrall to art’s immanent ability to 
reveal absolute truth.3 we now turn to the artistic condition.
aRt, PHilosoPHY and tHe PedaGoGiCal tHeMe
For Badiou ultimately, it is under the condition that there are truths that philosophy 
functions (Hi 5). the pedagogical theme he suggests is that which enables the encoun-
ter between these truths that are produced within the process of these conditions, and 
the thought which thinks them. it is in the essay ‘art and Philosophy’ that Badiou makes 
several explicit claims regarding education. as stated above, to my knowledge, this is the 
9. Badiou, ‘Philosophy and Mathematics’, p. 3.
30. Badiou, ‘a Philosophical task: to Be Contemporaries of Pessoa’, in Hi, p. 37.
3. Bruno Bosteels, ‘alain Badiou’s theory of the subject: the Recommencement of dialectical Material-
ism’, Part . Pli , 00, pp.00-9 and Part , Pli 3, 00, pp.73-08. 
3. Badiou, Hi, p.5. in regard to mathematics Badiou names the three schemata which organize the link 
between philosophy and mathematics, the ontological, the epistemological, and the critical. there is some scope 
for mapping the first three schemata from the realm of art and philosophy onto the latter from mathematics 
and philosophy but such an attempt must proceed with caution. and in any case Romanticism is for Badiou 
the central concern, as for him it is our subjection to Romanticism post-Hegel that constitutes the ‘time 
of our time’. see, ‘Philosophy and Mathematics: infinity and the end of Romanticism’, Theoretical Writings, 
p..
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only text in which Badiou addresses education qua education. indeed the term is (symp-
tomatically?) absent from his work. so for anyone looking for some sort of master meth-
odology or hoping to draw some instances from these claims that might be adapted to 
the contemporary scene of a state education, the following will (hopefully) be singularly 
unhelpful. what the several claims in this essay signify is an inherent pedagogical op-
eration, operating within Badiou’s project for philosophy which teaches the immanent 
power of what is (and is) not, as against the ruthless repetition of what must be. such 
is the project of all philosophy, Badiou contends, which is nothing less than discerning 
‘the possible modalities of a single statement: “the same is at once thinking and be-
ing”’.33 obviously the interconnection between pedagogy and philosophy is embedded 
in the tradition of the discipline itself. However, in the same way that Badiou determines 
one aspect of the relation between art and philosophy to have been characterized, the 
relation between education and the state has itself been one determined by a form of 
philo-sophistical surveillance. despite the plaintive cries lamenting the state’s attack on 
the academy, the university persists in being that institution which sets and determines 
the standard and form of the curriculum for the final years of high-school, as for itself.34 
it also, at the behest of and as an immanent function of the state, persists in being that 
nexus of knowledge and training which reigns down upon both the secondary and the 
primary schools, upon itself, and upon the social realm in general its methods, its eco-
nomic, social, cultural and psychological insights (such as they are) and its graduates. all 
this and so much more, operate as the education system. and today of course, as althus-
ser and lenin before him (and many others in various less radical ways) have pointed 
out, this is inextricably linked to the capitalist form of the state.35 Concerned as we are 
33. Badiou, Deleuze, p.79. the statement is of course from Parmenides. see translator’s note (p.37; note ) 
for an explanation of this translation.
34. Consider that the highest degree available in any discipline is still called doctor of Philosophy (Phd). 
it is thus that we here conflate the university, as an institution of the state and philosophy as the (master) 
discourse of this institution. apologies to lacan(ians) and, of course, to Plato(nists).
35. ‘the revolution that the bourgeois class has brought into the conception of law, and hence into the 
function of the state, consists especially in the will to conform (hence ethicity of the law and of the state). 
the previous ruling classes were essentially conservative in the sense that they did not tend to construct 
an organic passage from the other classes into their own, i.e. to enlarge their class sphere ‘technically’ and 
ideologically: their conception was that of a closed state. the bourgeois class poses itself as an organism 
in continuous movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it to its own cultural and 
economic level. the entire function of the state has been transformed: the state has become an “educator”’. 
antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebook, trans. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey nowell-smith, new 
York, international Publishers, 97, p. 60. one should note here that in the U.K. (as elsewhere) prior to 
the installation of the state-school many worker groups maintained a distance from this ‘good’ on offer 
by the state. Prophetically, or rather because they were very well aware of their relation to the state, they 
were concerned that it was merely a vehicle for further co-option. of course it is neither wholly one nor 
the other. Precisely this is Badiou’s reason for a move away from a traditional dialectics. this because 
it is in the sphere of representation that the void is seen to be included in the situation. this void, what 
immanently escapes significant representation, is the foundation for the new. one must be careful here 
though to not slip into liberalism which happily grants that in and through ‘education for all’ in its state 
sense, new relations emerge in the social. liberalism forecloses the void precisely under operations of 
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with an education which serves as a modality of a procedure of truth, a modality subject 
to the encounter of being and thought, then we are engaged with Badiou in thinking the 
thought that is, against such surveillance, and is ‘nothing other than the desire to finish 
with the exorbitant excess of the state’.36 
in the essay ‘art and Philosophy’ which serves to introduce a ‘series of variations’ 
on the theme inaesthetics,37 Badiou distinguishes three primary schemata which he main-
tains have governed the thinking of the modality of the link between art and philosophy. 
He links these schemata to what he calls the three ‘massive tendencies of thought’ in the 
0th century. in the 0th century these tendencies have become saturated by particular 
schemata which are in themselves ‘out of time’ due to the fact that they themselves are 
not the product of these 0th century tendencies. as such, in regard to the ‘thinking 
of art’ Marxism (dialectical materialism) is didactic, hermeneutics (after Heidegger) is 
romantic, and psychoanalysis (in relation to art, vis-a-vis aristotle) is classical (Hi 5). 
each ‘massive tendency of thought’ is thus saturated by being deployed in the form of 
a particular schema that either utilized or identified with them.38 Badiou contends that 
the thinking of the relation between art and philosophy has thus become saturated by 
the predominance of one of these three tendencies or, by a ‘simultaneously conservative and 
eclectic’ combination thereof (Hi 5 emphasis added).39 Badiou argues that these tenden-
cies saturated by their schemata are thus incapable of offering anything new in regards 
to thinking (the thinking of) art.
along with the production of a disentanglement between art and philosophy, some-
thing he restates in different ways in regard to philosophy and all its ‘conditions’40, this 
saturation has also produced ‘the pure and simple collapse of what had circulated be-
tween them; the pedagogical theme’ (Hi 7). the difficulty assumed in this essay, ‘art 
and Philosophy’—as in many others—is to account for the dis-relation that this link (a 
link he determines to ‘re-found’),4 signifies ‘between’ two entirely distinct, yet intimately 
reform. Reform or reaction, if you like, is a veil of the void. it incorporates any and all interruptions within 
itself as its virtue. in liberalism the individual under education may change his place in the social relation; 
the social relations themselves are maintained by just this move. see Mao tse-tung, Combat liberalism, 
Peking, Foreign languages Press, 954.
36. Badiou, Be, p. 8. see also Peter Hallward, ‘Generic sovereignty’, Angelaki, Vol 3, 998, p.9.
37. which he describes thus; ‘By inaesthetics i understand a relation of philosophy to art that, maintaining 
that art is itself a producer of truths, makes no claim to turn art into an object for philosophy. against aes-
thetic speculation, inaesthetics describes the strictly intraphilosophical effects produced by the independent 
existence of some works of art’. Badiou, Hi’ 
38. see, on these 0th Century tendencies, or ‘passion(s) for the real’, Badiou’s le Siècle. 
39. ‘though it is considered to be the century [0th] of endings, breaks and catastrophes, when it comes to 
the link that concerns us here, i see it instead as a century that was simultaneously conservative and eclectic’, 
Hi, p. 5.
40. see for example Badiou, ‘Philosophy and Mathematics: infinity and the end of Romanticism’, in Theo-
retical Writings, esp. pp. -.
4. see Badiou, Hi, where this link has ’collapsed’ and must therefore also be re-founded in the fourth mo-
dality; also, (cf) MP, where this re-founding is more accurately a return [of philosophy] {to} itself. see, ‘the 
Return of Philosophy to itself ’, pp. 3-38. 
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(non)related operations of thought. in other words, what is the method, in reality the 
non-method produced within the singular, situational praxis of these four ‘conditions’?4 
Badiou proposes a ‘new schema, a fourth modality of [this] link’, thus proposing a for-
mal trajectory, between art and philosophy (Hi 8). and one which at the same time 
‘subverts’ the sophistic ‘subterfuge’ that an artistic apprenticeship is the way to an edu-
cation (Hi ). 
while it is not the place of this essay to provide a critique of the veracity of Badiou’s 
diagnoses of those ‘schemata’ and their attendant saturation of the ‘massive tendencies’ 
(schemata, by the way, that can definitely be found to be operating ‘conservatively and 
eclectically’ (Hi 5)43 within the theory, policy and practice of the contemporary edu-
cation system), nevertheless it is necessary to follow closely the trajectory of Badiou’s 
diagnoses because it is against the ‘saturation’ of these schemata that he introduces his 
(un-explicated) and quite extraordinary notion that ‘the only education is an education 
by truths’ (Hi 4). what we will do is explore the ‘pedagogy of conditions’ in Badiou’s 
essay in order to understand how that which Badiou proposes as a ‘fourth modality’ of 
the pedagogical link between art and philosophy (Hi ), or of the re-entanglement of 
mathematics and philosophy,44 or the subjective role of justice that philosophy will come 
to seize from politics45 or the exact condition of the ‘immanent two’ that constitutes phi-
losophy as a thought of love,46 might offer a return of the pedagogical theme to itself, as 
an instance of overcoming its ‘collapse’ (Hi 7).
4. it is interesting on this point to compare with Badiou what Jacques Rancière describes as the ‘non-
method’ of intellectual emancipation ‘stumbled’ upon by Joseph Jacotot, whereby one may ‘teach what 
one doesn’t know’. this method, as with Badiou, begins with an axiomatic statement. Rancière declares an 
‘equality of intelligence’. thus: ‘let’s affirm then that universal teaching will not take, it will not be established 
in society. But it will not perish because it is the natural method of the human mind, that of all people who 
look for their path themselves. what the disciples can do is to announce to all individuals, to all mothers and 
fathers, the way to teach what one doesn’t know on the principle of the equality of intelligence’. see Jacques 
Rancière, The ignorant Schoolmaster: Five lessons in intellectual emancipation, trans. Kristin Ross, stanford: stanford 
University Press 99, p.05. cf. Badiou, ‘Philosophy and Politics’, p.7. ‘what does equality mean? equality 
means that the political actor is represented under the sole sign of his specifically human capacity…[t]his 
specifically human capacity is precisely thought, and thought is nothing other than that by which the path 
of a truth seizes and traverses the human animal’.
43. this at once ‘conservative and eclectic’ tendency is ruthlessly at work in the theoretico-policy work of 
the contemporary state system—at least here in australia and especially noticeable within the ‘new Basics’ 
regime of education Qld. it is also very to the fore in educational theory. this summary paragraph is 
all too exemplary: ‘each child, as a unique human being, can be enlarged and enlivened in the inclusive, 
enactive environment of the transactional curriculum. in such classrooms the lived experience of students 
and teacher co-exist, learning and knowledge co-emerge, the multiplicity of curricula converge, nature and 
nurture co-originate as product and process; and, the cognitive and non-cognitive learning of each as other 
are brought forth through pedagogical love into a new world of knowledge, acceptance and understanding. 
truly, in such classroom settings… “the light gets in”, and heart in becomes heart of teaching’. Blaine e. 
Hatt, (assistant Professor, Faculty of education) ‘Heart in is Heart of teaching’, in (funnily enough) ec-
clectica, december, 000, http://www.ecclectica.ca/issues/00/4/hatt.asp 
44. Badiou, ‘Mathematics and Philosophy’, p. 37.
45. Badiou, ‘Philosophy and Politics’, p. 7.
46. alain Badiou, ‘the scene of the two’, trans. Barbara P. Fulks, lacanian ink, no. , 003, p. 55.
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against the thesis that art is the being-there of truth, Badiou contends that the di-
dactic schema treats art as mimesis. this, Badiou insists, accounts for art’s singularity as 
a process (Hi 9). art functions as the charm of a truth. its power, derived from its imme-
diacy, consists in charming us away from the necessary ‘dialectical labour’ of reasoned 
argument that leads to principle (Hi ). art is imitation, in regard to a certain effect of a 
truth extrinsic to art as a process. art is true only insofar as it is a verifiable re-presenta-
tion of the truth. this capitalized, substantialized truth properly belongs to the regime 
of philosophy or at least to its police function. and as such truth is not a procedure im-
manent to art. in this sense there is no art other than what philosophy authorizes. as 
Badiou puts it, ‘[t]his position upholds a didactics of the senses whose aim cannot be 
abandoned to immanence. the norm of art must be education; the norm of education 
is philosophy’ (Hi 3). Here philosophy operates much as master to a pupil, verifying the 
truth of a work or, it’s the same thing, its good, by the effect it has in its display (Hi 3). in 
this schema, philosophy ‘graduates’ a work as art, subject to it effectively achieving a 
response in the spectator (the marker?) that the master, in accordance with the master’s 
knowledge of the truth, can verify as correct. the process of the work itself achieves 
only, and at best, the status of (the act of) re-presentation. didacticism as a pedagogy 
places all power in the hands of the master and the master’s knowledge. as Badiou 
argues in discussing the power of Brecht’s didactic art, ‘the philosopher is in charge of 
the latent supposition of a dialectical truth’ (Hi 6). it becomes essentially a question of 
sovereignty; a sovereignty retained by knowledge as truth over the mimesis achieved by 
mere practice; or, in another register; the intellectual over the manual. as we see in The 
Republic (at the point where it over-reaches itself—perhaps—in its desire to have done 
with ‘sophistry’) a strict protocol of surveillance is maintained between these two forms. 
an alienation is activated as all that proceeds in the city as the work of the day to day 
is only a semblance (or a semblance of a semblance) of the state. the truth of the state 
remains extrinsic to the functioning state. the ‘obvious’ gap opened by the ‘protocol’ 
of surveillance between the quotidian, working city-state and the sovereign truth of the 
state affirms the didactic demand of the ‘extrinsic objectivity of the true’ (Hi 6).
Romanticism, essentially in total opposition to the educative surveillance of this 
schema, understands truth to be that of which art alone is capable. in Badiou’s words 
regarding this schema, ‘Philosophy might very well be the withdrawn and impenetrable 
Father—art is the suffering son who saves and redeems’ (Hi 6) the relation between art 
and truth here is indeed one of immanence. the romantic schema proposes an educa-
tion by its com-plex of pure subjective example. it is an example of a practice which in 
itself is one of truth absolutely, because it ‘teaches of the power of infinity held within the 
tormented cohesion of a form’ (Hi 9). thus, only what the artist unveils of the infinite 
through the finitude of the work is true. Philosophy (as hermeneutics) bears this as the 
fundamental ground of its relation to art. Badiou says, ‘it is the same truth that circulates 
between them’ (emphasis in original). the philosopher thinker is held in thrall to the artist 
poet for it is the poet alone who ‘preserve[s], not Being itself …but the question of Being’ 
(MP 50). Pedagogically speaking, romanticism, under this analysis, has something in 
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common with pastoralism as its concerns are with the shepherding of that authenticity 
which (it supposes) inhabits the individual qua subject and which through the process 
invoked as its process alone, this truth of the individual (literally, of  the individual) might 
come to be revealed as the very speaking of Being. in this way the thinker (or teacher) 
is merely the reversal of the artist/poet/(true) subject, as they both approach the same 
truth. the truth reveals itself as Janus-like. Janus as shepherd of salvation from, pace 
Heidegger, the ‘annihilation that Being, in the terminal technical figure of its destiny, 
has as its being to will’ and pastorally, from the evil wrought by a certain ignorance (of 
God and all his shadows) 47 and towards a ‘resacralisation…’ (MP 5). Contrary to Mao’s 
dictum the two is here revealed as an effect of the one which is not at all a mere obverse 
of ‘one divides into two’.48 it is at this point that romanticism, despite itself, might be 
implicated in terms of the state. ideologically—and therefore educationally—speaking, 
to locate the very agency that provides the ballast of the subject within each individual 
uniquely, serves at the same time to structure the alienation of one subject from another 
as an inherent law of Being, or nature. thus the extrinsic, self-authorized truth of the 
state as the site of freedom is exhibited precisely through the authentic expression of 
alienation as effect. that is, the expression of this romantic alienation as the mark of the 
truth of being is not at all, at least under contemporary democratic state ideology, that 
of a radical separation but is precisely the kind of subjectivity authorized by that very 
state and (re)produced in its institutions.49 
the third schema, classicism, removes the question of truth from art altogether. Ba-
diou proposes that aristotle employed this schema to defuse, albeit in an unsatisfactory 
manner, the quarrel between art and philosophy, as Badiou puts it, fusing lacan and 
47. see, louis althusser, ‘ideology and the state’, in lenin and Philosophy and Other essays, trans. Ben Brewster, 
new York, Monthly Review Press, 00, where he says education as the dominant ideological state appa-
ratus is ‘as natural indispensable-useful and even beneficial to our contemporaries as the church was… for 
our ancestors a few centuries ago’, p.06.
48. alain Badiou, ‘one divides into two’, trans. alberto toscano http://culturemachine.tees.ac.uk/frmf.
htm. in this essay, discussing revolutionary China in the 960’s, Badiou articulates the conflict of these two 
positions. the latter is considered leftist because its partisans hold that, from the perspective of the revolu-
tion, there is no view of the one as synthesis in sight. so it is a maxim of division and struggle, of, if you like, 
continuing to draw the consequences of a central antagonism. the former, in this essay ‘two fuses into one’ 
is considered rightist, reactionary, a plea for a return to the ‘old one under cover of syntheses’. it is a conflict 
that occurs in a different form, to give it a nominal mark, between lenin and Kautsky. in both cases the 
reactionary form is the mark of a retreat, a throwing up of one’s hands, a declaring of ‘only a God can save 
us now’. this essay is translated from le Siécle, Ch 6.
49. Badiou, Be, pp.64-5. First published in english as ‘Hegel’, trans. Marcus Coelen & sam Gillespie 
umbr(a), no. , 996, p. 30. Badiou defines ‘bad infinity’ as the ‘repetition of the alternative between one 
and another under the law of “ought to be”’. see also alain Badiou, ‘a speculative disquisition’, in Meta-
politics, p.78. First published in english as ‘Highly speculative Reasoning on the Concept of democracy’, 
trans. Jorge Jauregui in lacanian ink, no. 6, 00, at www.lacan.com p.. ‘actually the word “democracy” is 
inferred from what i term “authoritarian opinion.” it is somehow prohibited not to be a democrat. accord-
ingly, it furthers that the human kind longs for democracy, and all subjectivity suspected of not being demo-
cratic is deemed pathological’. we suggest that with certain grammatical changes in place the term ‘educa-
tion’ can take the place of ‘democracy’ in these sentences and be understood in much the same way.
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aristotle, the classical schema ‘dehystericizes art’ (Hi 6). it declares art innocent of either 
hysterically submitting its always already there-ness to the master’s surveillance or of 
incarnating, in the simultaneity of the declaration and its act, the truth—self-identity 
as profound alienation. instead under aristotle’s classical prescription, which a certain 
‘applied psychoanalysis’ (Hi 7) carries into the contemporary situation, art is subordinated 
not to knowledge, but to its performance of an ethical function of therapy. it provides a 
space of ‘catharsis’ whereby art is that which ‘makes it so that the object of desire which 
is beyond symbolisation, can subtractively emerge at the very peak of an act of symboli-
sation’ (Hi 7). it provokes an affirmative, captivating and ultimately therapeutic effec-
tiveness upon the passions. this effect is rendered upon the passions through a process 
of ‘liking’, or verisimilitude, in which the work of art within the regime of semblance pro-
vides that likeness which ‘calls to mind’ what is true and arranges an identification which 
is always ex-centred and yet at the same time does not command the determination of 
the work itself (Hi 4). or, in more psychoanalytic language, according to Badiou it ‘links 
up to a transference because it exhibits, in a singular and contorted configuration, the 
blockage of the symbolic by the Real, the extimacy of the objet petit a (the cause of desire) 
to the other (the treasure of the symbolic)’ (Hi 7). the passions are relieved, desire is 
pacified, merely having ‘imagined’ this ex-centred truth (or, objet petit a) through the 
work of art.50 such a work, of itself, does not aim at this truth but renders its likeness 
50. it is interesting to note here what lacan himself said about desire in the context of state educators. in 
seminar Vii he says that desire—that desire one should never give up on—has been ‘domesticated by 
educators’ and ‘the academies’, he says, ‘betray it’. if we recall Badiou’s claim that ‘a thought is nothing 
other than the desire to have done with the exorbitant excesses of the state’, we come across a suggestive 
link between thought and desire. Further, lacan says, and alain Badiou takes this up, ‘what i call “giving 
ground relative to one’s desire” is always accompanied in the destiny of the subject by some betrayal’. lacan 
goes on to say that either the subject betrays himself in some way or that someone with whom he is involved 
betrays that to which they were jointly committed and this commitment is to some good. this betrayal 
sends the subject back to the service of goods but he is forever out of joint there. so my contention is overall 
that education functions today as a betrayal. what does it betray? it betrays the good. that it betrays some 
good rather than any individual in particular is both what allows this process of betrayal to be ‘tolerated’ as 
lacan says, (and one should hear this word especially in its contemporary context) and also illustrates the 
essential disinterest of the state in individuals as such. this good, as lacan sees it, is that which ‘serves to 
pay the price for access to desire’ and desire is, he says, a ‘desire for both what we are and what we are not’. 
Betrayal thereby is an act, rather a process that forecloses the possibility which inheres in the desire for the 
‘what we are not’. surely that desire or rather that we are desiring, is precisely that aspect of being which 
sustains that side of the subjective disjunction that we, at any given time are not, that which in fact we ‘will 
have been’. this desire then is like a wager on the future, or on the very being of an encounter; a future 
other than that which it has always already been. state education works its magic on the ‘what we always 
already are’ —the animal with interests inscribed in the signifying chain, interests expressed materially by 
our activities within the service of goods. How does a state education function in this way? Precisely because 
it prescribes, through its errant power to deploy its knowledge, ‘what we will do’ and what we will do subject 
to its demand is enter some-how, some-way—with a school certificate or with a Phd—into the service of 
goods. and the more we enter into it as lacan says, the more it demands. thus what this demand must pre-
vent is ‘…the least surge of desire’. see Jacques lacan, Seminar Vii The ethics of  Psychoanalyses, Jacques-alain 
Miller (ed.), trans. dennis Porter, london, w.w. norton, 997,  pp. 3-35. one should also juxtapose here 
Marx’s analysis of the July days in his 18th brumaire of  louis bonaparte, where he says something remarkably 
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‘constrain[able] within the imaginary’, an effect recognizable by the ‘catharsis’ achieved 
by the spectator. ‘art’, as Badiou says in relation to the classical schema, ‘captures desire 
and shapes [éduque] its transference by proposing a semblance of its object’ (Hi 5). such a 
state of affairs signals for Badiou, for whom truth and thought are intimately identified, 
that art, innocent of truth is therefore not a form of thought. it is, he says, little more 
than a ‘public service’ (Hi 5). Under the rule of patronage in the absolutist state so under 
the rule of ‘arts councils’ then in contemporary capitalist bureaucracy (or democracy), 
the therapy or, ethical catharsis that art will render must first be approved before any 
funding is forthcoming. to Badiou, the state, in relation to the thinking of art, is ‘es-
sentially’ classical (Hi 5).5 
as i have suggested an effect issues in the contemporary state of these three schema 
under the saturation of these tendencies.5 so, to reiterate and reduce: the didactic 
schema operates a pedagogy of surveillance, the romantic, a pedagogy of authentic 
identity as alienation, and the classical, a pedagogy of public service or state ethics. 
thus, we can say, subtracting from Badiou’s otherwise occupied assessment, that sur-
veillance, identity, and ethics make up, the pedagogical forms inherent to the ‘saturated’ 
0th century. according to Badiou, what these schemata have in common is the nega-
tive fact that all three propose a modality of this relation that we ‘must rid ourselves 
of ’ (Hi 7). For Badiou, this commonality is constituted by the fact that none of these 
schemata operate a pedagogical form that is both singular and immanent. it is because 
of this that they have offered nothing new. Concerned as we are with this link, with the 
‘pedagogical theme’, we must insist on two points: one, that effectively the reduction 
of these three schema through their negative commonality allows us to claim that what 
has effected this collapse as its own, is a ‘state’ pedagogy. second, that in regard to this 
state pedagogy it becomes possible to say that this collapse is a functional collapse.53 the 
pedagogical theme under the saturation of the state schema functions as a collapse that 
at the same time maintains an impasse. the operational function here is nothing other 
than the perpetuation of the state or, the knowledge of the state—which in Badiou’s 
words is the ‘profit of statification, calculable interest and placement’.54 and the impasse, 
similar in form regarding the betrayal of the proletariat by the bourgeois-democratic party. 
5. ‘[e]except for the socialist states which were “rather didactic”’, Hi, p.5
5. i have shown elsewhere how actual policy prescription from the state in regard to the everyday func-
tioning of education can be seen to operate under the injunction of similar schemata; whereby it operates a 
series of surveillance, alienation and an ethics thoroughly conducive to the perpetuation of the state form. 
all of these are shown to be ‘without truth’ in Badiou’s sense. see my ‘the Pedagogical theme: alain Ba-
diou and an eventless education’, anti-THeSiS, vol 6, 006, pp. 9-47.
53. it is instructive to compare this tripartite schema with Badiou’s own in ‘what is a thermidorean’, 
where he analyses that which is constitutive of a sequence of thermidor. such a sequence is objective in its 
conception of the country, conservative in its conception of law and obsessed with security. thus a triple 
alliance -objectivism, status quo and security. Under thermidor—and Badiou is certainly explicit that 
thermidor is now—a disarticulation is active. what it does is render a political sequence ‘unintelligible’. it 
produces the unthinkable. this is what we claim a ‘state’ education involves. see, Badiou, M, p. 9.
54. Badiou, M, p. 36. For example, a pervasive slogan of education in australia—one that enlists a wide 
and stupefying consensus—is that it functions to make one ‘job-ready’ or employ-able. one should above 
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as the effect of this operation, functions to preclude a subject from effecting the extent 
of its enquiries which is to say, ‘a truth from coming to be’.
Under the condition of singularity (irreducible taking place of truth) and immanence 
(whereby the condition is ‘rigorously co-extensive with the truth that it generates’), the 
‘pedagogical theme’ is granted a specific task within the infinite procedure of a truth. it 
must be that which ‘arrange[s] the forms of knowledge in such a way that some truth 
may come to pierce a hole in them’ (Hi 9).55 lest the philosophical act—the thoughtful 
composition of these disparate truths—be ‘nothing but an academic quibble’, there must 
‘be truths’. ‘[to] make truths manifest… [is] to distinguish truths from opinion’. to de-
cide therefore that there is ‘something besides opinion’ or, as Badiou ‘provocatively’ puts 
it, ‘something besides our “democracies”’ (Hi 5). on Badiou’s terms, education is that 
which makes the necessary arrangements for the manifestation of truths which are not 
opinions and which signify therefore the possibility for some other, new (political etc.) 
configuration. in fact using Badiou’s analysis it is not going to far to claim that as our 
democracies are manifestations of the organized rule of opinion then the state system of 
education for which our democracies are responsible is without truth, without thought, 
and thus cannot operate other than as either ‘oppressive or perverted’ or indeed as both 
(Hi 9).56 
what is significant concerning an education which arranges the forms of knowl-
edge in a way that can make truths appear therein is that this education can have no 
predication in those forms of knowledge. the process is immanent to the situation and 
it does proceed to work through the knowledge of the situation but that knowledge qua 
knowledge of the state (encyclopaedia) can have no determinative role over what is in 
essence a process of fidelity to what happens and not to what is. and this, as we know, be-
cause knowledge is a result; and as such, it never encounters anything. Knowledge is not 
that which is subject to the encounter but such an encounter is the very presupposition 
whose conditions of possibility it works to foreclose  (Be 395).57 this is why education, 
in Badiou’s sense, is a (permanent?) revolutionary process, an auto (but not individu-
all know or rather, be, what the bosses want. thus the good of education equates nicely with the ‘profit’ of 
these three. Badiou conceptusalizes this nicely: ‘today, it seems that ‘modernisation’, as our masters like to 
call it, amounts to being a good little dad, a good little mum, a good little son, to becoming an efficient em-
ployee, enriching oneself as much as possible, and playing at the responsible citizen. this is the new motto: 
‘Money, Family, elections’. see Badiou, le Siècle, p. 00. Many thanks to alberto toscano for the use of his 
forthcoming translation. i cite the page number of the French edition.
55. Badiou borrows this from lacan who is nothing less for Badiou than ‘the educator for every philosophy 
to come’. see, Badiou, ‘truth: Forcing and the Unnamable’, in Theoretical Writings, p. 9.
56. what is perverted, we could say, is fidelity, what is oppressed is the (possibility of a) subject. althusser’s 
contention in regard to state education being the leading isa in our epoch should be recalled here. 
57. cf. Rancière. The ignorant Schoolmaster, pp. 6-7. Rancière says this; ‘before being the act of a pedagogue 
explication is the myth of pedagogy, the parable of a world divided into knowing minds and ignorant ones, 
ripe minds and immature ones, the capable and the incapable, the intelligent and the stupid’. Jacotot calls 
the method of the master ‘enforced stultification’. the trick of the pedagogue in this sense is two. on the 
one hand the pedagogue decrees when learning is to begin; on the other he presents all that is to be learned 
as veiled and the pedagogue of course is the only one who can lift this veil.
a. J. BaRtlett 55
alistic) education whose only predicate is the axiomatic form. an axiom being, as we 
have said, the immanently produced principle of the event; the formalizing, within a 
linguistic address capable of transmission, of that which has effectively disappeared. as 
such the subject, this finite support of the truth of this address, is in fact he/she/we/it 
which educates and is educated in the faithful process of this arrangement. subject then 
to the inherent declaration of the political event, the equal capacity of all for thought, 
the arrangements carried out by this subject of the forms of knowledge—or the enquiry 
of enquiries within the situation—will constitute a ‘generically educative set’, as each 
enquiry whose trajectory is regulated by chance, whose ethic amounts to the courage 
to continue, reveals elements of the initial set that confirm the justice (i.e. belonging) of 
the evental declaration. the generic is not an act of representation but a regathering of 
presented terms—singularities—subject to their belonging (Be 396). and belonging is a 
relation whose intercourse with inclusion, or representation by the state, is not mutually 
reciprocal. the latter, being what the state in its excess must assume. Given then, that 
the pedagogical theme is effectively ‘caught’ in the non-space between what presents of 
truth subject to an event, and the state of that situation which is the procedure of an-
nulment of the extensive consequences of these truths, this theme then must perform 
something of a dual operation of subtraction and forcing which in turn is the very con-
stitution of itself. as such it becomes legitimate to say that education amounts to nothing 
more and nothing less than establishing the effect of  an encounter as a transformation. and this 
is said of course under illegitimate conditions.58
sPeCUlatiVe ReMaRKs on tHe CoMPlex PRoCedURe: sUBtRaC-
tion and FoRCinG
‘transformation’, in the work of Badiou, ‘goes under the name of ‘generic truth pro-
cedure’.59 as we know, the generic truth procedures or, the conditions in relation to phi-
losophy, produce these truths in the singular labour they perform. to put it bluntly they 
render an existence; an existence precisely, ‘wrested from all founded inclusion’, from 
that is, the knowledge that represents it as nothing. and ‘nothing’, as Badiou claims, 
‘can be granted existence… without undergoing the trial of its subtraction’.60 to put it 
somewhat schematically the pedagogical theme in this process articulates the affirma-
58. in passing, this authorizes us to turn the socratic problem of the teaching of virtue (and despite the vicis-
situdes of ‘interpretation’ in regard to this term and the utilitarian disavowals, this is the ongoing question of 
education especially at a time when the state represents virtue) from a question into an axiom. Rather than 
consider virtue from the perspective of knowledge and then consider the mode of its transmission as such, we 
can instead now begin with the declaration ‘virtue teaches’. Here we have the form of a truth whose veracity 
is wholly suspended in the procedure it authorizes. From this point the deductive process of subjecting this 
declaration to the real of the situation defines ‘an education’. as lacan put it, ‘to be on the side of virtue is 
not to change under an effect of law’. ‘Kant with sade’, ecrits.
59. oliver Feltham, ‘and Being and event and…: Philosophy and its nominations’, in Polygraph, no. 7, p. 
7.
60. Badiou, ‘on subtraction’, p. 03.
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tive core of a taking away. the state form of education so long concerned with that 
which supports its addition—what the Brazilian educator Paulo Friere once described 
not inappropriately, as a ‘banking education’—functions in thrall to a logic of quantitative 
repetition. as we have mentioned, it cannot conceive of itself as split or divided in any 
affirmative way and so its adding is always that which serves to repeat what it is under 
the law, as Badiou says, of ‘what must be’. thus to proffer truth as revolt against the state 
it is logically necessary to locate that which is negated by the state. and further in order 
to avoid transcendence or the appeal to any form of theology it is doubly necessary to 
affirm that ‘void-site’, affirmed through a process of ‘taking away’, as wholly within the 
situation ordered by the state. one, in fact, divides into two. eschewing the explicative 
equations, we know, via the axioms of foundation and separation that any situation 
represented as a one is at some point constituted by a division, a point where the consist-
ency, or the well ordered-ness, or constructability of the set or situation cannot hold. it is 
from this point that subtraction proceeds to render an existence, which is nothing more 
than the operations necessary to make being appear. 
subtraction essentially names four operations which Badiou says are irreducible to 
one another. they are: the undecidable, which philosophically is linked to the event; 
the indiscernible, linked to the subject; the generic to truth; and the unnameable to 
an ethics of truths.6 essentially, subtraction works by ‘voiding’ all predication. as an 
operation of thought it asserts the primacy of being over language. However, Badiou 
cautions, it is not a process of extraction, of ‘drawing out of ’ but it is one which ‘draws 
under’.6 For Badiou, there is no position from which to operate upon a situation other 
than from within that very situation. as is the case in all Badiou’s analyses however, 
there can be no clearing of the ground before something takes place.63 so this removal 
of predication is a part of the very process initiated by the act of irruption or surrection 
within the situation. what marks the difference between an event as an interruption 
within the situation and say a strike for wages and conditions, is precisely that in the 
latter the state is immediately able to include such an interruption within its order of 
operations. it may instigate negotiations, declaim the strikers in the press or send in its 
police but in any case such a strike ‘fits’ within the logic and knowledge of the state.64 
the logic of subtraction pertains to the event in an intrinsic form. the event so to 
speak undoes or will have undone, through its sheer novelty, the order of this knowledge 
6. Badiou, ‘on subtraction’, p. . the latter term has disappeared in recent times. we will maintain it 
here as it nevertheless has an ethical truth to it which continues in Badiou’s work under new names, per-
haps.
6. Badiou, ‘on subtraction’, p. .
63. ‘destruction was my Beatrice’, Badiou says, quoting Mallarmé, comparing his Théorie du sujet to l’étre et 
l’événement. le Siècle, p. 85.
64. indeed most strikes today seem to a priori fit themselves to the demands of the state. at a recent 
teachers’ ‘rally’ in Melbourne the police were accorded an ovation for their efforts at securing the march. 
teachers, after all, are not in any way enemies of the state. too often they are slavish petitioners desirous 
only of being well thought of by their master. like althusser, i make an exception for the ‘militant’ few. see 
‘ideology and the state’.
a. J. BaRtlett 57
of inclusion and thus, subtracting from the state of the situation its formal process of 
evaluation, it opens a space which marks the immanent separation of the truth of the 
state from its knowledge.65
However, as we know, it is of the very ‘empirical character’ of the event to disappear. 
and as Badiou says, ‘this is why it will always be necessary to say… the event has taken 
place’.66 this statement in effect constitutes a decision for the undecidable. effectively 
it is a decision which intervenes in the indices between the event and its naming as 
an event. the decision decides for the event, itself subject to pure contingency. it is 
constitutively an act of fidelity which is ontologically prior to any ‘formal announcement’. 
it is a pure ‘yes’ saying, to use a nietzschean formula, but within the confines of a wager. 
the decision says nothing more than that which happened, happened. the decision 
founds a declaration; to the effect that what has disappeared has being and it is to 
this declaration that the subject is faithful. the subject, being that which crosses any 
temporal conditions by declaring a fidelity to a sequence that ‘will have been true’ and 
at the same time pursues the consequences of this ‘evental occurring’ within the situation 
as the finite being that it (also) is. the pursuit of the consequences has no predicative 
order, no established law by which the subject guides itself in its enquiries. as Badiou 
puts it, such a subject is ‘a hazardous trajectory without a concept’ one who can find 
no verifiable comfort in the representations of the object of his enquiry or from the 
principle of objectivity more generally.67 what then is the logic of this subject’s progress 
given that it is faced at every turn with the necessity to choose and yet due to its fidelity 
to a disappearing and devoid of a law of operation, it has no way to distinguish between 
terms? Given this situation, whatever terms present to the subject for choosing, present 
as properly indiscernible. we must first backtrack somewhat for it appears we have 
two subjects; one which decides for the undecidable and one which is ‘co-ordinated by 
the indiscernible’.68 we must recall that we are tracking the trajectory of a truth as it 
makes its way across a situation. we could say the four figures of subtraction mark the 
stations of its progress. in regard to a temporal schema it is not the case that one station 
follows the other in a graduated stage of becoming. there is no particular time frame 
or objective determination which either verifies the time of a truth nor determines the 
instances of the subject within a chronological form. the schema of the truth procedure 
is operationally structural and it is true to say that a truth after circuiting the trajectory 
of the structure under the logic of subtraction, will only be seen or be ‘known’ to have 
been true once it has effectively returned as the ‘knowledge of the subject’. this subject, 
Badiou says, in relation to its procedure is ‘ruled in its effects, but entirely aleatory in its 
trajectory’ (Be 394). thus to decide for the undecidable is to immediately be situated 
between the event and the void; two indiscernible terms. and in terms of Badiou’s 
65. Badiou, ‘on subtraction’, p. .
66. Badiou, ‘on subtraction’, p. .
67. Badiou, ‘on subtraction’, p. , also Be, p. 394.
68. Badiou, ‘on subtraction’, p. 3.
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schema, this place is ‘at the edge of the void’. 69 the subject then is structurally situated 
between—or is founded as the split of—the disappearance which it has decided for and 
the void, or nothing, from which the order of its trajectory must be drawn. it is not that 
the subject so situated has to choose between nothing and nothing. Rather, it is that the 
subject faithful to this constitution as the fragment of a disappearance and the order of 
the void proceeds to make enquires from the perspective of a truth that will have been 
‘true’ and not from that of the knowledge of the state. thus, as the logic of truth is such 
that its addresses itself to all indifferent to differences—circumcized or uncircumcized, 
Greek or Jew—the subject proceeds as that which does the work of indiscernibility, 
effectively subtracting the mark of difference.70 the subject proceeds with what Badiou 
calls confidence, a ‘knowing belief ’ (Be 397). Belief being, Badiou says, the ‘what is to 
come under the name of truth’ (Be 397), such that, pedagogically speaking, the knowledge 
the subject has recourse to, is essentially this confidence. this confidence equates with 
the belief that what is discernible is subject to an order of thought whose trajectory, is 
indiscernible. the subject has confidence that the truth to come will have been true for 
the very situation within which the subject proceeds to conduct its enquiries (Be 397). 
such confidence, we can say, owes its modal power to that procedure Badiou names 
‘forcing’; ‘a fundamental law of  the subject’ (Be 40).
the complex ontological exposition of ‘forcing’ (the term taken from Paul Cohen) is 
beyond the scope of this essay. instead, in order to situate the subject as that which per-
forms this act and as that which constitutes itself in this act, we will sketch its topology in 
a speculative interlacing of Badiou’s concept with the notion of the pedagogical theme. 
let’s preface what we are here faced with: an understanding or rather a declaiming of 
education as contingent, risky, without predicate, opposed to knowledge, subject to fi-
delity, to courage, to a certain ruthlessness in regard to continuing. education in essence 
is founded on the chance encounter between a site and its inconsistency, that sets forth 
subtractively to maintain this irruptive demand from pure multiplicity by a forcing of its 
truth through the terms already known to the situation. with such effect that a transfor-
mation literally takes place. to go to school, sit up straight, attend, repeat with a certain 
facility and graduate well behaved, which includes of course suitable acts of rebellion, 
certainly appears the simpler form.
to educate is certainly to transform. to have been educated is no doubt to have 
been transformed. thus education amounts to either ‘being’ or, ‘to have been’ trans-
formed. the questions, of course, are: by what, from what, to what? is it by the state 
whose goal is perpetuation and whose method thereby is predicated on meiosistic rep-
etition or, in althusser’s more ‘structural’ terms reproduction (of the relations of produc-
tion)? or is it by truths and thus to be transformed without predicate, educated without 
69. we could posit that it is precisely at this point that mathematical inscription and poetic inscription 
‘meet’. see, alain Badiou, ‘lacan and the pre-socratics’, in lacan: The Silent Partners slavoj Žižek (ed.), lon-
don, Verso, 006, p. .
70. alain Badiou, St Paul: The foundation of  universalism, trans. Ray Brassier, stanford University Press, stan-
ford, 003, p. 6.
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curriculum, subject to the ‘what will have been’ by grace of the event? a procedure 
which is at once immanent and thus without surveillance and singular in that it univer-
sally presents singularities without representation (Be 40). But what is this thing that is 
being or has been transformed? Certainly contemporary democratic educational logic, 
as we have seen above, performs a process of subjectivisation whose goal is the creation 
of a certain individual(s) fit for the state. this state mode of transformation apprehends 
the collective as a generically amorphous mass, both empty of what it is that makes them 
fit for the state and possessed of nothing but this. this mass is then that which, via the 
processes of the state, will be operated on in such a way that it will render to the state in-
dividuals capable of performing pursuant to the norms, laws and procedures of the state. 
the subjectivizing process of the state as transformation from equality of ignorance to 
equitable redistribution as heterogenous entities conforming to its ‘count’ renders a re-
presentation of ideologically self-identifying individuals. it achieves a sort of one to one 
correspondence in which each, libidinally invested in the other, considers an ‘objective’ 
interest to be theirs in common.7 that is, the state guarantees the suitably educated 
subject access to his/her interests. as suitably educated, the interests of this subject will 
correspond, more or less, to the interest of the state.7 and of course in its excess the state 
terrifies this subject through its retaining the imminent threat of withdrawal. its exces-
sive count for one, that operation by which a state is the state of the situation, collecting 
one-multiples into one-parts constitutively threatens un-representation. its subjects are 
thus those whose very representation as ‘a’ subject is subject to their desire for represen-
tation. such a desire is the very constitution of their subjectivity. such is why theories of 
recognition are so attractive in social theory today. and such is why notions like adapt-
ability, flexibility and ‘availability for learning across the life-span’ proves so intensive 
in educational discourse. these are of course pure subordinate responses to the state as 
excess provided by the state itself for the subject: a balm for permanently open sores 
and they remind us of nothing less—and this is entirely appropriate in this context—of 
lacan’s description, ‘from a philosophical perspective’, of the truth of human rights 
7. in this ‘new and risky future’ the New basics will deliver a student who is ‘flexible’, ‘adaptable’, capable of 
a form of ‘self-analysis that copes with this flexibility’ and possesses an ‘educability’—for ‘retraining across 
the life-span through a range of media’. the student will be capable of ‘designing him/herself a ‘social 
future’, be proficient in the ‘care and maintenance of  the self ’ and practice an ‘active citizenship’—within our 
‘democracy’. it should come as no surprise that the theoretical parameters of the three year longitudinal 
research of which the ‘new Basics’ is both a result and an experiment were coordinated by a constructivist 
and reconceptualist paradigm. see, New basics Research Paper. no. . ‘synthesis and Research’. p.6 http://
education.qld.gov.au/corporate/newbasics/ and New basics Technical Paper, pp. 85-6 lacan’s remark in 
relation to sade’s treatise on the education of young girls should be recalled here: ‘the victim is bored to 
death by the preaching and the teacher is full of himself ’, lacan, ‘Kant with sade’, ecrits, p. 664/787.
7. a subject capable of making their way within a ‘globalized information environment’ such a subject 
[will help] ‘…gain access to the benefits (sic) of the knowledge economy of the future…’[a]nd ‘will improve 
our [Qld’s] economic performance’. non-performance’ of this ‘role’, this document says, has ‘dire 
consequences for the individual’. see, education Qld 00, ‘new Basics Research Program’, 003, pp. 
3-0. available through http://education.qld.gov.au/corporate/newbasics/. the use of the term ‘role’ is 
somewhat fascinating, but we leave it to ‘sit’ here.
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as ‘the freedom to desire in vain’.73 opposed to this is the subjectivizing process of the 
generic truth procedure whose initiation in the event as disruption of the state—of pre-
cisely its excess—convokes a collective as subject (in the case of a political situation). its 
address, so to speak, is carried by the practice of its thought; by that of which ‘we are 
equally capable’. For Badiou, no subject at all precedes this subject. subject to the axi-
omatic declaration of an equal capacity for thought any one (multiple) might be/could 
be/can be transformed from public alienation into the collective subject alienated from 
the public. this is a subject at once of and to truth. of this we can say that a subject is 
that which at each stage ‘will have been educated’. so there are two readings of what 
it is to be transformed. on the one hand, the ‘thing’ is transformed into an individual 
issuing as and within the states permanent reordering of its parts. Representation here 
makes void the possibility of ‘generic extension’. that is to say, the site of the generic is 
represented as nothing. and on the other, from the egalitarian multiple is subtracted, 
subject to the disappearance that is the empirical mark of an event, the generic set 
whose trajectory as infinite collection proceeds by subtracting itself at every step from 
the logic of the situation in which it labours. 
what then makes this anything but some form of anarchic wandering? what makes 
this education by truths distinct from no education at all or mere reaction? the state is 
after all (and this is a symptom we must be very attentive to, i suggest, such is the basis 
for this exploration) determinedly focussed on an ‘education for all’. Publicly, this is 
seen as its chief credit or virtue (just think of the dialectic of election time rhetoric and 
publicity where education is demanded by the state and equally by its petitioners) and 
again we must be attentive to this as a symptom. what serves to differentiate here are 
two things: one, as we have seen, is the event itself. it establishes the possibility for the 
new in being. a subject is convoked who, under the discipline of a fidelity to that which 
is disappeared, itself becomes a rising of that which was not. secondly, in regard to the 
subject we must ask the question, what does this subject hold to? the subject is that 
which is caught in a procedure between what has gone and what is to come. we know 
that truths interrupt knowledge, that they are in fact an a-voidance of (the determinants 
of) knowledge and so on. But what of the subject split by the ‘two’? How can it avoid 
knowledge? the question in relation to forcing is two-fold. on the one hand there is 
some knowledge, while on the other, by fidelity, this subject is faithful to that knowledge 
which is sustained in its veracity as knowledge by the future anterior and as such, it is 
knowledge that is itself the effect of a ‘rearrangement’. it is in this space that education by 
truths is enacted. Between the event and its forcing, or rather, as its forcing, a subject is 
educated. to quote Badiou: 
what one must be able to require of oneself, at the right time, is rather that 
capacity for adventure to which ontology testifies, in the heart of its transparent 
rationality, by its recourse to the procedure of the absurd; a detour in which the 
extension of their solidity may be restituted to the equivalences: ‘He shatters his 
own happiness, his excess of happiness, and to the element which magnified it, he 
73. lacan, ‘Kant with sade’, ecrits, p. 66, 783.
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rends, but purer, what he possessed (Be 54). 
Badiou’s claim that ‘the only education is an education by truths’ demands in fact that 
this equation result. thus we can say that, as the finite carrier of an infinite procedure, 
a truth, it is only a subject who is educated. 
it has been argued elsewhere that forcing constitutes the real praxis of the subject 
and i can only concur with this.74 By extension, i am suggesting that it is entirely within 
a praxis of this type that an education takes place, whereas in the state situation ‘nothing 
takes place but the place’ which is to say the ‘positive’ production of impasse. so rather 
than force a subject to be educated, in this idea, forcing, as that complex of the subject, 
is what educates. as part of the complex of forcing we can say that it is by non-knowl-
edge that the subject proceeds. as we have seen, the subject follows no curriculum, no 
pre-established method in its enquiries. that it makes inquiries at all is, as Badiou says, 
subject to chance: on the one hand, the chance of an event occurring and, on the other, 
the decision for its occurring qua event. But with no ‘method’, how does the subject 
proceed? 
For any ‘obscure occurrence’ to be an event it must produce its name in the subject. 
the name given by the subject, as an act of its very subjectivity, under condition of the 
event, belongs in the first instance to the subject-language. it is the singleton of the oc-
currence in Badiou’s terms. this name is the minimal condition of the subject qua en-
quiries, or for us, of the subject qua education. How then to ‘remake’ the name, a name 
already included by state knowledge, into a name belonging to the occurrence? that is, 
how does the name make evental that which is ‘obscure’? in this first instance the sub-
ject supports the transitory status of the name which is at once attached to an obscurity 
and an encyclopaedia. in a sense this is a first instance of ‘tearing holes in knowledge’. 
the name is subtracted from the encyclopaedia of the state for which language is the 
‘medium of commensurability between itself and the situation it represents’ (Be 88). 
the void, by which the name as supernumery is founded as exposed, is mobilized in 
the subjective procedure of forcing. Precisely through this immanent gap—between 
the presentation of inconsistency marked by the event and its consistent presentation 
marked by the (void) name of this event—a truth procedure authorizes itself. Forcing 
hereby names the procedure of tearing the name from encyclopaedic inclusion and 
remaking it as belonging to the event.75 similarly to the dual nominalism of ‘condition’, 
‘forcing’ also names the arduous process of this becoming-true, of which fidelity is the 
ethic of a militant operation and subtraction the mode of deployment. By its series of 
74. oliver Feltham, As Fire burns: Of  Ontology, Praxis, and Functional Work, unpublished Phd diss., deakin 
University, 000.
75. thus, Badiou calls the statement of the subject-language in regard to names ‘bricolés’. see alain Badiou, 
l’être et l’événement, Paris, Éditions du seuil, 988, p. 44. Barker translates this as ‘makeshift’ (p. 07), and 
Feltham as ‘cobbled-together’, Be, p. 403. the point is that this name is brought about by a forced relation 
between the language of the situation and the subject-language. the latter itself is a part of the former but 
is co-coordinated by a different ‘logic’. see, Jason Barker, Alain badiou: A Critical introduction, london, Pluto 
Press, 00.
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enquiries the subject establishes, in the first instance, the connection or non-connection 
of this name to the multiples of that situation through which it works (Be 330). this is 
the procedure which establishes (or does not) the grounds for the universality inherent to 
the disappeared event by organizing via connections the ‘belonging to’ the ‘generic set’. 
thus these enquiries follow a militant trajectory of connection—multiples subtracted 
from the laws of presentation—and a subsequent decided deployment rather than a 
‘scholarly’ process which by (institutional) instinct and not by thought, seeks to mediate 
and not commit.76 structurally speaking, we could say that the scholar marks the ‘place 
of announcement’. 
 ‘education for all’, that common refrain of the representative state, thus takes on a 
very different and critically particular meaning in this process than that which is meant 
by this state. to put it schematically, we might say that the latter is concerned with what 
to do with its subject within the confines of a state, and the former with the extension 
‘for all’ of that which a subject is capable.77 at every step, forcing articulates the crucial 
aspect of this minimal difference by its imposition of its positive connections. the name 
of the event thus holds as that single term by which the infinite of the truth of the event 
may become veridical over and above its declaration.78 But as was mentioned above, 
this is not, as some have intimated, simply the coming of a truth back to knowledge. or 
rather; it is and it is not.79 the whole point of Badiou’s enterprise is of course that the 
situation as it is is transformed in truth. thus the statement ‘for every situation there is 
a truth’ is, as we can see, the complex of a disjunction and its synthesis or, the ‘junction 
76. Hallward, badiou, p. 6.
77. in relation to Badiou’s newer work in which the faithful subject opens a space within which the ‘reactive 
subject’ and the ‘obscure subject’ can also come to exist, we can argue that what education today educates 
for is a ‘reactive subject’. this is a subject who is constituted by an education which tells that an event is 
unnecessary, that attempts at establishing ‘justice’ are not worth it, that truths are relative (or belong to ‘fact’ 
alone), and that opinion and consensus decide the political and so on. what is of interest is that the ‘obscure 
subject’ and the ‘reactive subject’ seem to have an investment in each other. 
78. one should recall here Badiou’s text on nietzsche where he singles out nietzsche’s conflation of the 
declaration and the event as the form of an archi-politics. see, ‘who is nietzsche?’ Pli: Warwick Journal of  
Philosophy, no. : nietzsche: Revenge and Praise, 00.
79. in relation to what we are calling the pedagogical theme—that truths mobilize a desire for the end of 
the state—what we mark here is that socrates’ crime is all that it is made out to be. socrates does not bring 
knowledge but rather he submits all to the singular procedure of subtracting truth from knowledge. Plato 
describes this in the Sophist as that of ‘follow[ing] our statements step by step and, in criticizing the asser-
tion that a different thing is the same or the same thing is different in a certain sense, to take account of the 
precise sense and the precise respect in which they are said to be one or the other’. Having hereby affirmed 
the procedure affirmed in the socratic practice he then goes onto impute to the sophist a method ‘like’ but 
ultimately unlike, due to its proximity to the sensual and the immediate. He says, ‘merely to show that in 
some unspecified way the same is different or the different is the same, the great small, the like unlike, and 
to take pleasure in perpetually parading such contradictions in argument—that is not genuine criticism, 
but may be recognized as the callow offspring of a too recent contact with reality’. Plato, ‘sophist’, in Plato’s 
Theory of  Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist, trans. F. M. Cornford, Mineola, dover Publications, 003, 
59b-d, pp. 97-8. see also Plato, ‘Parmenides’, in Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides’ Way of  Truth and Plato’s 
Parmenides, trans. F.M. Cornford, london, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 939, p. 3.
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of a disjunction’ (Be 39). this is because this statement contains two temporal sche-
mas. First, the schema marked by the claim ‘for any situation there will be a truth’ and 
by the statement, ‘for any situation there will have been a truth’ and thus the knowledge 
that ‘returns’ is precisely not the knowledge that was. and further this knowledge does 
not by necessity merely reprise the structural form of the previous knowledge for that 
situation. as andrew Gibson has made a point of, what are forced are generic exten-
sions to the situation and not the constructions of ‘new’ situations entirely.80 as Cohen 
showed ontologically and Badiou here translates philosophically in relation to being 
and truth, a generic set is situated precisely in the space ‘normally’ occupied by the 
state. and this space is the immeasurable excess of inclusion over belonging: an excess 
for which, in Badiou’s metaontology, the event provides the first measure.8 the price 
for the avoidance of transcendence, as for holding fast to the axiom ‘the one is not’, is 
that of extension. extension, however, is in no way reform. the latter, as we know, is 
almost constitutive of the contemporary state. it exists only to reform and this reform 
is of course in order to better capture whatever threatens to escape. and nowhere it 
seems as much as in education (and this is consensual) is this type of reform regarded as 
imperative.8 extension of course is the extension by evental rupture of that which was 
represented as nothing—precisely the ‘truth of the situation’. somewhat paradoxically 
but logically, representation exposes the unique singularity immanent to the situation 
it represents —that of the void, the very possibility of extension, of same/other. the 
subject is again this figure of, or rather in, extension. to put it somewhat enigmatically 
we can say that extension is what ‘sames in truth’ what was ‘other in knowledge’. thus 
the modality of extension is forcing and thus the subjective trajectory is that which is 
forced on two sides. the two relate to Cohen in particular. on the one hand the subject 
comes to be under the axiom of choice. it decides itself into being as it decides for the 
undecidable; that an obscure occurrence is an event subtracted from all knowledge; or 
as Badiou puts it, ‘knowledge knows nothing of  this’ (Be 33, Badiou’s italics). on the other 
‘side’ the subject is forced by that which continues. it continues faithful to the undecid-
ability which it has decided for.83 it has decided that there will have been a something 
(rather than nothing) to decide for. structured in this way it can hold fast to the name 
80. andrew Gibson, ‘Repetition and event: Badiou and Beckett’, Communication and Cognition, vol 37, no. 3-4, 
004, p. 7.
8. Hallward, badiou, p. 3.
8. again this should be read as symptomatic and not as evidence of the state’s good intent. it has two forms. 
on the on hand the state must of course organize the worker/consumer in such a way as to be readily 
available in the right way for subjection to the dominant relations of production. But it must also do this 
under the ideological cloak that it thereby reflects the ‘non-ideological authentic longing’—to quote from 
Žižek—of the population for precisely what is perceived of education, as being that which is more than just 
such a ‘job readiness’. the idea that education is not just utilitarian training is that idea, prevalent in the 
community at large, which enables the capture of all under the education system. a system dear to the state 
for reasons already outlined. 
83. Cohen, of course, proved the independence of CH from the axioms of set theory. CH is thus ‘undecid-
able’.
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subtracted from (thus independent of) the state encyclopaedia but known to the subject 
by its belonging to the ‘makeshift’ subject language.84 the real force of the subject then is 
precisely the maintenance of this ‘complex of forcing’.
the subject, as we have seen, has nothing, purely nothing, as its curricular instruc-
tion; no method, no syllabus, no state. the trajectory of the educated subject is a-void-
ance, of the state and of knowledge. it is separated from the state by its non-knowledge 
and from the truth that will have been by an ‘infinite series of aleatory encounters’ (Be 
399). what it has is pure structure or rather pure axioms of operation by which it regards 
every step of its enquiries. such is why fidelity for Badiou is drawn from mathematical 
procedures of deduction and not from its theological variant.85 and we propose that 
this fidelity, under the complex of forcing, extends into the situation itself. should such 
a truth procedure be ‘forced’ into the situation, should a truth come to be that which it 
was, fidelity to that fidelity which extended and sustained the procedure does not end. 
should there be an end, then decidedly we have had reform but not revolution, not 
transformation.86 even though Badiou reminds us that knowledge in its constructivist 
orientation with its ‘moderated rule, its policed immanence to situation and its transmis-
sibility’ is unavoidable, he at the same time reminds us that this is the ‘ordinary regime 
of the relation to being under circumstances in which it is not time for a new temporal 
foundation, and in which the diagonals of fidelity have somewhat deteriorated for lack 
of complete belief in the event they prophesise’. then again, Badiou claims that even 
for those ‘who wander on the borders of evental sites staking their lives’ on events, ‘it is, 
after all, appropriate to be knowledgeable’ (Be 94). But even as it is in the process of 
enquiries that a faithful subject approximates a procedure of knowledge, such enquiries 
are nevertheless first and foremost a matter of a militant fidelity. such a fidelity demands 
that the void constitutive of every situation not be foreclosed or veiled or counted as 
no-thing but be rigorously marked as such: which is to say that this, at a certain point, 
necessary coincidence with knowledge must not itself be coincident with a taming by the 
state (Be 94). only in this way is ‘justice done’ and subjects appear in their belonging 
as constituted by this very fidelity to their belonging, and not as the mere consequence 
of an ‘inclusive education’.87 that is to say that ontology, which presents beings in the 
84. to the state what the ‘subject knows’ is precisely nothing at all. in Platonic terms the subject is that 
which can claim only that it ‘knows nothing’. this claim ‘places the void’ within the situation. non-knowl-
edge as void of knowledge is that name of the void which is the very mark of their knowledge. the subject 
sets their enquiries by this mark in order not to fall back into the knowing comforts of the state—such as 
they are.
85. a variant still very prominent in the methods of the state through the pastoral-welfare complex it runs 
as an ideological ‘soul supplement’ to the material ‘syllabus of the market’.
86. Ultimately this is why Badiou talks of exhaustion not ends. a procedure can become exhausted, subjects 
may be lacking, but the truth for which a subject is a subject has not, by this, come to an end. and nor are 
we finished with truths. 
87. as is well known, ‘inclusion’ is the concept of the age. it and ‘recognition’ form the crux of a weak left-
ism—taken up by the ‘democracies’ as their rhetoric of choice—which still sees a state education, a state 
program, as the way to (social) justice. or, to use the timid and defeated contemporary form, ‘equality of 
opportunity’. 
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singularity of belonging, links with truth as that which is true for all or not at all and 
with justice which is the philosophical name for equality whose very being is the pres-
entation of a ‘communism of singularities’. Ultimately the invariance that pertains to 
education, to the name education in the generic phrase ‘education for all’, is that which 
today must be forcefully subtracted from the state; which is to say the one multiple that 
it is must be found to be ‘indiscernible and unclassifiable for the encyclopaedia’ of the 
state (Be 333). Plato’s Republic was one attempt at this, being as it was an ideal non-state 
articulated on the basis of a certain event within the state (of the situation).88 as Badiou 
has said, we need a ‘new Republic’ for it is quite obvious that today the educated-sub-
ject—a being struck by the desire to think the truth that it also is, and thereby produce 
a generic present—is precisely that which cannot be tolerated. as Badiou says, such a 
subject, linked as it is to the infinity of a truth and its generic indiscernibility, is ‘without 
qualification’ (Be 408) and fundamentally irreducible to ‘the pedagogy of the world as 
it goes’. 89
a. J. Bartlett 
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